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Hungary stands out as the least dramatic transition in the region. Whereas other countries 
experienced massive demonstrations in favor of democratic demands, or violent upheavals 
resulting in the execution of dictators, Hungary experienced neither and has been referred to 
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“In contrast to the rest of the East European countries, mass movements did not 
topple the old system in Hungary, and in the course of the Hungarian transition 
it was not so much the mass support enjoyed by the opposition but rather the 
passive rejection of the old system that played the decisive role.” (Bruszt 1989: 
386).
Among the Eastern European democratization  processes of  the 1989 period, 
Hungary stands out as the least dramatic transition in the region. Whereas other 
countries experienced massive demonstrations in favor of democratic demands, 
or  violent  upheavals  resulting  in  the  execution  of  dictators,  Hungary 
experienced  neither  and  has  been  referred  to  as  an  “uncomplicated”  case 
(Munck & Skalnik Leff: 352). While some mobilization from below occurred, 
the Hungarian transition is  characterized  by elites  –  new and old – and the 
intentional exclusion of the population at large. Why did the democratization 
process unfold this way, and why did a seemingly stable regime give up without 
a fight? These are some of the questions this report seeks to answer. 
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Periodization
While it is always difficult to establish the starting point of a transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy, the peculiarities of the Hungarian case make 
this truism even more salient.  Unlike its counterparts in Czechoslovakia and 
East Germany, the Hungarian leadership had in part been characterized by a 
propensity to reform since at least the 1960s. Although these early reforms, such 
as  the  New Economic  Mechanism (NEM) program,  had  focused  mainly  on 
economic as opposed to political interventions, they still represented important 
steps toward a less centralized system. As I will show below, these reforms, 
enacted  without  any  significant  pressure  from below,  allowed at  least  some 
individual economic autonomy from the state. However, despite this progressive 
development towards democracy in Hungary, which stands in sharp contrast to 
the abrupt ruptures in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, several important turning 
points can be identified.
One could argue that the earliest of these turning points is represented by 
the aborted 1956 revolution. While ultimately a failure in the strictest sense of 
the term,  the 1956 revolution was at  least  a  partial  success  as  it  forced the 
Hungarian communists to abandon their Stalinist course. As Bruszt and Stark 
(1991) explain, “although suppressed from public attention, memories of the 
lost  revolution of  1956 were never forgotten over the decades,  and signs of 
crisis were the surest stimulant for recalling this haunting past. … Thus, with 
little exaggeration, we can say that the end of 1988 still marked a period of the 
“long  50s”  in  Hungarian  history”  (213).  Nevertheless,  the  1956  revolution 
probably played an ideological and psychological role at best, and the road to 
democratization can more appropriately be traced through the actual political 
steps taken in that direction. For example,  after the Hungarian economy fell 
victim to the crisis of the 1970s, the government eventually felt forced to act. 
Following  the  suggestions  of  its  own  economists,  some  of  whom  were 
themselves reform-minded, in 1977 the government not only returned to some 
of the liberalizing reforms that had been abandoned earlier in the decade, but 
also decided to move “more radically towards the market economy, to abandon 
import-substituting industrialization and to stimulate export capable sectors to 
production for a world market” (Kontler 2002: 456). Importantly, the reforms 
also included provisions for the “abandonment of earlier reservations relating to 
small-scale  enterprise  in  general,  and  the  lifting  of  earlier  restrictions  that 
concerned  it  in  industry”  (Kontler  2002:  456-7).  While  not  explicitly  steps 
toward  democratization,  these  reforms  certainly  signaled  the  government’s 
recognition that the integration of Western elements had become a necessity.   
In the early 1980s, reformist members of the communist elite began to 
consider alternatives as to how to accomplish “socialist pluralism” in Hungary. 
As  I  will  discuss  below,  the  Hungarian  communists  sought  to  shape  their 
opposition  in  a  way  that  would  allow  them  to  remain  in  power  while 
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simultaneously  moving  the  country  in  the  direction  of  pluralism (Munck  & 
Skalnik Leff 1997: 351-2). Again, this courting of the opposition occurred over 
a  period  of  years,  but  even  within  this  process  one  can  identify  important 
milestones.  One  such  landmark  was  the  removal  of  the  party’s  long-term 
general secretary, Janós Kádár, in favor of the more progressive Károly Grósz. 
The  change  of  guard  took  place  at  the  Hungarian  Socialist  Worker’s  Party 
(HSWP) Congress in May 1988, where the now senile Kádár was “honored” 
with the ceremonial  -  and inconsequential  -  title  of “president of the party.” 
While Grósz was by no means the most reform-oriented member of the party’s 
leadership, he was joined in the revamped politburo by reformers Imre Pozsgay 
and Rezső Nyers. This transformation of the HSPW leadership helped set the 
stage for the political transition (Schöpflin 1991, Saxonberg 2001; Stokes 1993; 
Swain 2006).
If the starting point of the transition is difficult to establish due to the 
relatively long duration of reform in Hungary, it is easier to identify potential 
end points. The formal transition occurred, as in most other Eastern European 
countries,  through  a  National  Roundtable  (NRT).  The  NRT,  which  will  be 
discussed  below,  was  agreed  upon  on  June  10  1989,  and  deliberations 
commenced three days later (Bruszt & Stark 1991: 228; Sajó 1996: 79). While 
an important date in Hungary’s path toward democracy, it may make more sense 
to highlight September 18, 1989 – the day the NRT agreement was signed by 
both the party-state and the opposition and the road to free elections in 1990 
begun upon (Bruszt & Stark 1991: Garton Ash 1990: 57). Yet another important 
date to consider is October 23, 1989, the thirty-third anniversary of the outbreak 
of the 1956 revolution. On the evening of that day, Mátyás Szűrö, the speaker of 
the  parliament,  announced  the  ratification  of  important  constitutional 
amendments and proclaimed the new Hungarian Republic (Garton Ash 1990: 
59; Kontler 2002: 468). 
Perhaps a more direct expression of Hungary’s new democratic aura is 
represented  by  the  November  26th referendum initiated  by  two of  the  more 
“radical” opposition groups. Unhappy with a provision in the NRT agreement 
that would allow the president to be elected directly by the population rather 
than by parliament, the Alliance of Free Democrats and Fidesz (the “student 
party”)  gathered  enough  signatures  to  force  a  referendum,  which  they 
subsequently won, thus dealing a blow to the reformed socialists’ chance of 
taking at  least  the  presidency in the  new Hungary  (Sajó 1996:  88-9;  Swain 
1992: 27). Finally, one could of course propose March 25, 1990 - the day of the 
first free parliamentary elections - as the completion of the transition, while the 
election  four  years  later  where  power  was transferred  back to  the  socialists 
could be considered the consolidation of Hungarian democracy (Bruszt & Stark 
1991: 240-1; Welsh 1994: 330). Regardless of which date one settles on, Munck 
and  Skalnik  Leff’s  (1997)  conclusion  is  worth  contemplating:  “Hungary’s 
transition was relatively uncomplicated. … While Poland's transition dragged 
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on over two and a half years, Hungary's was complete in less than nine months” 
(352).            
Structural Conditions
As  mentioned  above,  the  Hungarian  case  differs  greatly  from  those  of 
Czechoslovakia  and  the  GDR.  Unlike  the  latter  countries,  the  Hungarian 
transition occurred with minimal mass mobilization and societal pressure from 
below.  How can this  divergence  be  explained?  It  seems socialist  Hungary’s 
relatively liberal history may be the key to solving this puzzle. Like its Eastern 
European neighbors, Hungary came to be ruled by communists of a Stalinist 
persuasion in the wake of World War II. It was not until 1949 however that the 
Stalinists  secured  control  of  both  the  party  and  the  state.  In  that  year,  the 
Communist  Party,  which  in  1945  had  2,000  members,  boasted  a  massive 
membership  of  1.5  million.  In  addition,  the  state  was  protected  by  140,000 
political  police  officers  and an army of  210,000 soldiers  by  1952,  naturally 
backed  by  Soviet  advisers.  Formerly  autonomous  organizations  including 
churches were nationalized and brought under the control of the Party (Ekiert 
1996: 42-3). As in other communist countries, government excesses eventually 
caused  the  population  to  rise  up.  In  Hungary’s  case,  Ekiert  (1996:  45)  has 
argued that a combination of factors - the collapse of the forced industrialization 
scheme  and  the  economic  breakdown  that  followed,  intra-elite  struggles 
between Stalinist and anti-Stalinist forces, and the uncertain future of the region 
following Stalin’s death - led to the outbreak of the 1956 revolution.        
While the revolution was relatively short-lived, lasting anything between 
12 days and a few months depending on one’s definition of a revolution/revolt, 
its consequences were “profound” (Ekiert 1996: 37). The old Stalinist regime 
“experienced  almost  complete  institutional  breakdown  and  was  de  facto 
overthrown by the revolutionary popular movement from below”, and only the 
Soviet invasion prevented a fundamental political transformation from taking 
place. Moscow installed Janós Kádár, the head of the newly formed HSWP, as 
Hungary’s new leader.  While  not  as  reform-minded as Imre Nagy,  who had 
briefly assumed leadership of communist Hungary for the few days between the 
old regime’s collapse and the Soviet invasion,  and who was executed in the 
revolution’s aftermath, neither was Kádár a Stalinist. Rather, he was fortunate 
enough to come to power at a time when Nikita Khrushchev was consolidating 
his own more liberal form of communism in the Soviet Union following Stalin’s 
death.  As  a  consequence,  no  major  purges  took  place  within  the  post-
revolutionary  communist  party  and it  thus  became “the  only  East  European 
[communist  party]  which  after  1956  and  1968  not  only  abstained  from 
liquidating the reformist wing but integrated it” (Kende 1982: 7).
Ekiert  (1996:  101-4)  has convincingly argued that  the outcome of  the 
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1956  revolution  provided  Kádár  with  a  unique  opportunity  to  rebuild  the 
socialist state without much internal pressure from either the left or the right, 
nor from Moscow. One outcome of the revolution was that both the Stalinists 
and the reformers had been purged “naturally” from the core of the party. The 
old  regime  had  fled  to  Moscow  and  Nagy  and  his  collaborators  were 
neutralized,  at  times  through  execution.  Despite  a  brief  moment  of  post-
revolutionary violence, Hungary’s new leaders managed to consolidate power 
astonishingly quickly. Once that had been accomplished, Kádár moved Hungary 
away from either extreme on the socialist spectrum, and managed to create a 
relatively successful form of state socialism.
The fact  that  Hungary turned out to be the most  liberal  of  the Soviet 
satellite states can be explained by its unique relationship with the Soviet Union 
at  this  formative  time.  Unlike  East  Germany,  which  experienced  its  1953 
“revolution” at a time of great Soviet uncertainty following Stalin’s death, and 
Czechoslovakia,  whose  1968  “Prague  Spring”  occurred  after  the  more 
authoritarian  Brezhnev  had  outmaneuvered  Khrushchev  in  1964,  Hungary’s 
1956 revolution and consolidation benefitted from Khrushchev’s less intrusive 
approach to Eastern Europe.  In short,  it  was Khrushchev who helped Kádár 
come to power  and gave him relative liberty to construct  post-revolutionary 
Hungary. As Felkay (1989) explains,
Kadar  never  forgot  his  indebtedness  to  Khrushchev  and  found  his  de-
Stalinization policies admirable. To prove his loyalty,  Kadar never made any 
major decisions without Khrushchev’s approval. Thus, the sixty-three-year-old 
Khrushchev and forty-five-year-old Kadar gradually grew fond of each other. 
As a  consequence  of  this  personal  and working relations,  Hungary received 
favorable economic considerations  from the  Soviet  Union,  while  Kadar  was 
granted more freedom to manage the country’s domestic affairs. (113)
The fact that the special relationship between Hungary and the USSR is more 
accurately captured as a relationship between Kádár and Khrushchev has also 
been highlighted by other scholars. Vali (1961) notes that “Kadar and his group 
aligned themselves so closely to Khrushchev’s policies and leadership that the 
Kadar regime depended, for its stability, more heavily on the personal successes 
and prestige of  Nikita Sergeyevich than any other  Soviet  satellite  regime in 
East-Central  Europe”  (401).  As  a  consequence,  Bruszt  (1989)  concludes, 
“among all  state-socialist  systems it  was Kadar’s system that  removed itself 
most  from the  basic  model  established  in  Stalin’s  time”  (383),  and  Stokes 
(1993)  asserts  that  “of  all  the  Communist  parties  in  Eastern  Europe,  the 
Hungarian was the most reform minded” (79). The price for domestic freedom 
was  “adherence  to  Moscow’s  line  in  foreign  policy”  (Falk  2003:  113),  a 
relatively  manageable  political  levy.  Thus,  by  the  mid-1960s,  Hungary  had 
emerged  as  “the  happiest  barrack  in  the  Soviet  camp.”  The  near-complete 
destruction of the old regime in 1956 had allowed Kádár to build a socialist 
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state its citizens could live with (and in). I suggest that this structural context 
goes quite some way to explain the lack of visible mass discontent in Hungary 
as well as Party reformers’ willingness to engage with the “opposition.”
While still politically closed, Hungary manifested openness to economic 
liberalization as early as the 1960s. Cooperatives were allowed to experiment 
with auxiliary business schemes, a society-wide “second economy” developed 
without  much  resistance  from  the  government,  and  cultural  diversity  was 
tolerated (Stokes 1993: 81-3; Hankiss 1990: 15). Kádár himself was before all 
else a pragmatic politician who lacked the ideological dogmatism of many of 
his  Eastern  European  colleagues,  as  evidenced  by  the  New  Economic 
Mechanism (NEM). When it was enacted in 1968, the NEM contained reforms 
that provided industrial sector enterprises with autonomy designed to result in 
profit  maximization,  schemes  for  increased  economic  planning  on  the  local 
rather than the national level, as well as price and wage reforms (Falk 2003: 
113-4). Thanks to the application of certain market  economy mechanisms to 
Hungary’s command economy, the country experienced considerable progress 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s: “Hungarian grain yields exceeded the average 
in  the  EEC countries,  per  capita  meat,  fruit  and vegetable  production  came 
second only to the most advanced economies of the world, and in terms of the 
general standards of agriculture Hungary was esteemed to rank closely behind 
the eight most developed countries of Western Europe” (Kontler 2002: 440). 
Despite  its  impressive  advances,  Hungary  remained unable  to  withstand  the 
downturn  that  came  with  the  worldwide  economic  crisis  and  the  five-fold 
increase of oil prices in 1972-73. But perhaps more importantly from a 1989 
perspective,  Hungary  was  still  doing  better  than  its  Eastern  European 
counterparts (Stokes 1993: 79). 
One of the main problems associated with the economic downturn was 
that the state was forced to take out loans on the international market in order to 
meet its domestic obligations. The country’s debt rose from $1 billion in 1970 to 
$9.1 billion in 1979. This development forced politicians to listen to Hungarian 
economists  and  open  the  economy  to  the  global  market.  Preceded  only  by 
Romania (1972), Hungary joined the IMF in 1982. Internationally, membership 
was facilitated by the fact that the country had already introduced some of the 
austerity measures the IMF favored. Domestically, “a report discussed by the 
central  committee  in  October  1977  explicitly  recognized  that  Hungary  was 
going to have to improve its position in the world market” made the transition 
smoother (Stokes 1993: 80). In short, the country’s economic difficulties did not 
prevent  it  from  persisting  in  its  economic  liberalization  policies.  On  the 
contrary, this state of affairs made liberalization more feasible.       
The HSWP continued to liberalize the economy throughout the 1980s. 
Shops could be leased from the state, and by 1986 ten percent of the country’s 
restaurants were privately owned and turning a combined profit equal to that of 
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the remaining (state  owned) 90%. Similar  developments took place in  other 
branches  of  the  economy,  yet  still  Hungary  could  not  resolve  its  dangerous 
economic  situation  (Stokes  1993:  84-5;  Swain  2006:  145).  More  and  more 
Hungarians were forced to work both in the formal and the informal economies, 
and by the  middle of  the decade  “the second economy was so extensive in 
Hungary that virtually the entire citizenry engaged with it  in the routines of 
daily life” (Falk 2003: 117). While this allowed people to continue to make a 
living despite the ever harsher economic context, the second economy incurred 
a heavy cost: “in the mid-1980s, the country ranked first in international suicide 
statistics, and second in those relating to the consumption of spirits and liquors” 
(Kontler 2002: 458). Despite its best efforts, the state was unable to reverse the 
negative economic trend. At the Party congress of 1985, “Kádár had to admit 
that the standard of living had declined, and speaker after speaker criticized the 
government for its inability to prevent inflation or to provide adequate housing” 
(Stokes  1993:  87);  so  that  “by  1988  the  economy  was  as  bankrupt  and 
exhausted as the theory of reform economics” (Bruszt & Stark 1991: 214). Still 
there  was little  political  reform to boast  of.  In  1985 the Party reformed the 
electoral  rules,  giving  the  citizens  a  choice  on  the  ballots,  but  naturally  all 
candidates still represented the Party. Nevertheless, this was an indication of 
things to come. As we shall see next, Hungary’s precarious structural situation 
combined with contingent factors to propel the initiatives of those Party leaders 
most inclined to reform not only the economic system, but also the political one. 
Contingent Political Opportunities
As in the case of both Czechoslovakia and the GDR, Hungary’s transition to 
democracy cannot be understood without considering the wider regional and 
global changes that took place from the mid-1970s (the Helsinki Accords) and 
culminated with the emergence of Gorbachev as the new (in every sense of the 
word) leader of the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. However, the effects of both 
of  these  events  are  different  in  the  Hungarian  case  as  compared  to 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany: while the Hungarian opposition benefitted 
from reforms and sought to exploit the changes emanating from Helsinki and 
the Kremlin,  political  opportunities  in  the Hungarian case are  probably  best 
understood in terms of possibilities for  reform from above. Whereas the new 
emphasis on human rights and political and economic liberalization emboldened 
dissidents in Prague and Leipzig, its impact in Hungary was not limited to the 
opposition.  Rather,  Hungarian  reform  communists  interpreted  these  new 
currents as an opportunity for them to accomplish a controlled transition to the 
pluralistic  polity  they  considered  a  necessity  if  Hungary  was  to  solve  its 
economic problems. Furthermore, while the Helsinki Agreement’s emphasis on 
human  rights  combined  powerfully  with  Gorbachev’s  call  for  glasnost and 
perestroika in much of Eastern Europe to stimulate dissent, the accords had only 
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an indirect impact in Hungary. Rather than creating human rights groups of their 
own, Hungarians responded to the human rights provisions by protesting against 
the crackdown on Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. This can likely be explained by 
the fact that the human rights situation in Hungary was considerably better than 
in  the  rest  of  the  region  since  the  Hungarian  state  largely  left  its  citizens, 
including  dissidents,  alone  (Kis  1995).  Consequently,  on  January  9,  1977, 
thirty-four intellectuals sent a message to Pavel Kohout in Prague in which they 
declared  their  “solidarity  with  the  signers  of  Charter  77”  and  their 
condemnation of “the repressive measures used against them” (Falk 2003: 128). 
While  important,  this  response  suggests  that  Hungarian  activists  were 
comfortable enough to be able to concern themselves with the human rights of 
others. 
Rather  than triggering decisive action among the opposition,  then,  the 
reform  winds  of  the  1970s  and  1980s  had  an  important  impact  on  the 
communist leadership. As Bruszt (1989) explains, 
In Hungary, just as in other East European countries, the dramatic change in the 
external environment enabled factors within the country to play a decisive role 
in  formulating  the  system.  For  the  first  time  since  1948  an  opportunity 
presented itself to openly suggest a change in the model, and for the first time it 
became possible to make a fundamental change in the power structure. While 
previous  Soviet  leadership  groups  almost  instantly  sanctioned  any deviation 
from the basic model by way of direct and indirect pressure and interference, 
the new leadership under Gorbachev let it be known to Hungarian leaders that 
its  primary objective  was  not  to  upset  social  peace  in  Hungary,  and that  it 
regarded social stability as more important than adherence to the Soviet model. 
(381)
Moscow’s new approach to its  satellites provided reformers within the party 
with a powerful trump, as “Gorbachev’s rise to power deprived Kádár of part of 
his pragmatic acceptance,” meaning that “he could no longer claim the Soviet 
Union  was  preventing  him  from  going  further  with  reforms.  Since  the 
Hungarian  Communists  had based their  pragmatic  acceptance  on testing  the 
borders  of  what  the  Kremlin  would  allow,  the  younger  Communists  were 
willing to go even further and to democratize society” (Saxonberg 2001: 284). 
For its part, Hungarian society welcomed Gorbachev’s reforms. As early as June 
1986,  following  a  visit  to  Budapest,  Gorbachev  showed  such  interest  in 
Hungarian reformers’ willingness to take on his proposition that he sent one of 
his most trusted reform minds, Abel Aganbegyan, to assist Rezső Nyers in the 
Hungarian liberalization efforts. As Stokes (1993) summarizes, “by 1987, the 
question was not so much reform versus recentralization, but rather what sort of 
reform to implement and how fast it should proceed” (91). In short, unlike in 
Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Romania, Gorbachev’s reform ideals met with 
little resistance in Hungary (Stokes 1993: 99).
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In addition to  political  opportunities  offered from the East,  Hungarian 
leaders came under pressure to reform from the West.  As mentioned earlier, 
Hungary had attempted to resolve its financial difficulties by opening itself up 
to  the West  and by borrowing money from the IMF. In order  to  secure the 
continued in-flow of Western capital, Hungary was under pressure to “meet the 
human rights criteria set by the West” (Bruszt & Stark 1991: 211). This resulted 
in  an  unlikely  scenario  where  Soviet  and  Western  pressures  on  Hungary 
converged, and made it relatively easy for its leaders to advocate reform on both 
the political  and economic  levels.  When Grósz  replaced Kádár  in  1988,  the 
speed of liberalization increased further. Whereas the latter had once proclaimed 
that “what Gorbachev is trying to do now, we already accomplished decades 
before,”  the  new leader  recognized  the  importance  of  staying  ahead  of  the 
Eastern  European  curve.  Otherwise  Hungary  would  risk  “losing  millions  of 
dollars and Deutschemarks in potential aid and credits during a period when its 
hard-currency foreign debt had doubled in  only two years” (Bruszt  & Stark 
1991: 211). As one scholar elegantly concludes, 
During  1987  and  1988  the  Hungarian  leadership  “managed”  to  double  the 
indebtedness  repayable  in  dollars,  and  while  the  threat  that  Hungary  could 
become insolvent appeared every day, Western creditors gave increaseingly [sic] 
direct  indications  that  they  would  be  willing  to  continue  financing  the 
Hungarian economy only in exchange for significant changes in the economy. 
In  other  words,  as  Gorbachev stabilized  his  position,  a  situation  evolved in 
which Hungary was subject to simultaneous pressure from both the East and the 
West.  Pressure from the East aimed for political  changes to prevent societal 
crisis, while the forceful “pull” from the West called for a radical transformation 
of the economy, also implying changes in the political structure. (Bruszt 1989: 
382)
Clear the path towards reform even further, as Szabó (1995: 395) explains, it 
had become impossible for observers to determine whether Moscow considered 
Hungary’s  increasingly  unabashed  courtship  of  the  West  a  security  risk,  or 
whether  the  leadership  viewed  Western  aid  to  Budapest  as  “something  that 
served Soviet ends as well.” In short, there existed few external obstacles to 
liberalization in Hungary. On the contrary, Hungary experienced a unique set of 
international  factors  that  made  reforms  not  only  possible  but  positively 
appealing to both Cold War camps. In addition, elite factors served to aid this 
development. As the economy headed toward bankruptcy in the 1980s, the Party 
and  its  leaders  began  to  lose  their  ideological  legitimacy.  Furthermore, 
Hungary’s leaders recognized that its current difficulties could not be solved 
within a Soviet-style system. While elite factions disagreed over whether true 
democratization was a necessary part of reform, virtually all of them agreed that 
“radical market reform” was essential (Saxonberg 2001: 284). However, those 
advocating only economic liberalization soon found themselves in the minority, 
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as few Party members, many of whom were younger and more reform inclined, 
wanted to be on the wrong side of history as the country prepared to enter a new 
phase. The reform wind from the East was thus probably the most important 
political  opportunity  for  democratization  in  Hungary,  as  it  allowed  elites  to 
speed up reform processes.  Naturally,  such  reforms indirectly  benefitted  the 
opposition as it provided them with more room for maneuver. 
Elites
As noted in previous sections,  Hungary stands out  from many other Eastern 
European countries due to the fact that its political elites affirmed the necessity 
of reform early on. In the late 1960s, the Kádár regime had already begun to 
show greater tolerance to both  opposition and society as a whole. During this 
time the  unofficial  “second  economy” emerged while  the  government  made 
minimal effort to constrain it (Hankiss 1990: 15). The economic difficulties of 
the 1970s did little to slow down the process of reform, as suggested by the 
changes decided at the HSWP’s Twelfth Congress held in March 1980. Some of 
the most important conclusions drawn at the congress are reflected in the words 
of Sándor Gáspár, the head of the trade unions’ national council, who argued 
that Hungary could “best strengthen the country’s economic power… if we rely 
on democracy,  on  the  clash  of  opinions  and interests,  and  on the  increased 
participation of the working population” (Stokes 1993: 84). This link between 
economic progress and a democratic order came to dominate the mindset of the 
leading Party members in the second half of the decade. In short, it seems clear 
that the aim of the reforms was not democracy per se, but rather an avenue 
towards economic recovery. Democracy was simply seen as way to accomplish 
this more important goal. Evidence that the HSWP prioritized economic rather 
than political  reform is  represented  by the fact  that  the 1980 Congress also 
legitimated the second economy, and in 1981-82 several laws were passed to 
facilitate the proliferation of autonomous businesses (Stokes 1993: 84). 
The state’s  inclination  to  reform soon began to  manifest  itself  on  the 
political level. Although choice was limited to candidates from the Party, the 
1985 elections represent the country’s first “multiple choice” elections. For the 
first  time  in  socialist  Hungary,  the  election  ballot  presented  a  choice  of 
candidates rather than the option of either approving or disapproving the slate as 
a whole. Taking advantage of this novelty, the Hungarian people immediately 
expressed their discontent with the party by removing  all incumbents on the 
ballot.  While the Party had made sure that  the most  radical  reformers never 
made it on to the ballot in the first place – a result of the stellar work of the  
Party organization known as the Patriotic People’s Front (PPF) – the election 
sent a clear message to those in power, and in particular to would-be reformers: 
the citizens of Hungary were not content with the Party’s accomplishments, and 
given the chance they would remove anyone associated with its failures (Falk 
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2003:  140-1;  Stokes  1993:  90-1).  Although  Hungarian  democratization 
transpired gradually, the 1985 elections mark an important point in the process.
In part  because of  the wake-up call  provided by the elections,  reform 
minded Party members sought to take advantage of Hungary’s new political 
reality in the 1980s. “By April 1986, the pro-reform economists László Antal, 
László  Lengyel  and  Márton  Tardos  decided  that  the  economic  crisis  was 
becoming so grave that they should put together some sort of document spelling 
out their case for renewed economic reform” (Swain 1992: 16-7). Their effort, 
which gained the support of two leading reformers, namely Imre Pozsgay and 
Rezső  Nyers,  helped  initiate  the  intra-party  debate  that  would  eventually 
culminate in the events of 1989. Through the PPF, of which he was the chair, 
Pozsgay thus commissioned a report that listed the economic problems facing 
Hungary in an objective and unapologetic manner. Turning Point (or Turnabout) 
and Reform addressed such issues as
the  squandering  of  labor,  energy,  raw materials,  and capital;  the  inability to 
adjust to world trends; and wasteful investment allocation. It went on to make a 
startling proposal to fix them: introduce the profit motive through marketizing 
reforms.  … For  this  to  happen,  the  report  concluded,  political  change  was 
needed. No party should be above the law, individual rights should be protected, 
and an independent judiciary should be introduced. (Stokes 1993: 91)
While the document was debated by various academic entities, it was rejected 
by the Central  Committee, which established that it  was the Party’s,  not the 
PPF’s, job to guide the country. The document was thus officially ignored, but 
the  damage  had  already  been  done:  Turning  Point  and  Reform further 
established a divide between those Party members in favor of political reforms 
and those against. 
The struggle between reformers and conservatives culminated in the extra 
Party Congress of May 1988. At this point, Saxonberg (2001: 285) suggests that 
the party still consisted of three factions: reformers, conservatives, and centrists. 
At the Congress, the long time party leader Kádár was removed from power and 
replaced by his prime minister, the centrist Károly Grósz. As general secretary, 
however, Grósz took an ideological turn to the right and became increasingly 
conservative. This move upset existing alignments with the consequence that 
other  centrists  felt  forced  to  choose  between  becoming  either  reformists  or 
conservatives. As it turned out, although the new general secretary had become 
a conservative, the other three most powerful members of the revised Politburo 
were  all  reformers,  namely  Miklós  Németh,  Nyers,  and Pozsgay.  Few other 
major  changes  took  place  at  the  conference,  but  following  a  “summer  of 
inaction,”  the  fall  witnessed  some  substantial  changes:  “at  the  beginning  of 
November  the  Central  Committee  opted  less  ambiguously  for  political 
pluralism, the lifting of censorship and the transfer of most party privileges to 
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government. Grósz also relinquished the premiership to Németh, while Pozsgay 
submitted to parliament the ‘democracy package’ of July” (Swain 2006: 146).
These  dramatic  changes  within  the  leadership  structure  produced  near 
immediate results in the lower levels of the party. As early as November 1988, 
the first of many “Reform Circles” was announced in Szeged.  Reform Circles 
were  groups  of  party  members  from the  local  branches,  and thus  not  party 
officials, who worried that drastic changes to the system could jeopardize their 
careers and livelihoods. They therefore began to distance themselves from the 
Party leadership and to seek controlled change from “below.” By April 1989, 
these  Reform  Circles  were  popping  up  everywhere,  targeting  their  local 
leadership and ousting conservative leaders. In May 1989, the National Council 
of Reform Circles held its first meeting (Bruszt & Stark 1991: 225; Swain 1992: 
20-1). While not elites per se, the reform circles were certainly not outsiders or 
civil society actors, as they belonged to the party and organized on that basis.
A final episode that illustrates how far the Party had moved in its reform 
efforts before the opposition convinced it that negotiations about the country’s 
future were necessary is represented by a report submitted to the Party’s central 
committee in  January  1989.  Pozsgay was the main author  of  the  document, 
which condemned Hungary’s communist past, and while it failed to gain official 
recognition, the central committee was forced to recognize that the Party had 
moved from the idea of “socialist pluralism” to “a position of rejecting the basis 
of  its  own  existence”  (Stokes  1993:  100),  and  had  done  so  with  minimal 
pressure from non-party groups.
Why  were  Hungarian  communists  so  open  to  reform?  Three  main 
possibilities emerge from the literature. First, many of the younger members of 
the  Party  had  grown  up  in  a  relatively  open  environment  after the  1956 
revolution. They thus felt little gratitude to the Soviet Union, and little need to 
defend the actions of their predecessors. In fact, Pozsgay’s 1989 report referred 
to the events of 1956 not as a “counterrevolution,” which was the officially 
accepted position within the Party, but as an “uprising.” In short, the communist 
ideology  had  ceased  to  have  much  meaning  for  them  (Hankiss  1990:  30). 
Second, the party leaders, everywhere on the spectrum, were afraid. Only some 
recalled 1956, but all were familiar with the lessons learned, not least important 
of which was the execution of Imre Nagy. If the leader of that era could be 
executed so easily, what awaited die-hard proponents of the system responsible 
for his death (Saxonberg 2001: 288)? The Party was, in one observer’s words, 
“afraid of  the people” (Garton Ash 1990:  49).  Finally,  there  were economic 
gains  to  be  made by the  elites.  “In  the  late  1980s a  substantial  part  of  the 
Hungarian party and state bureaucracy discovered a way of converting their 
bureaucratic power into lucrative economic positions and assets (and indirectly 
also into a new type of political power) in the new system based on market 
economics and political democracy” (Hankiss 1990: 30). These three reasons, 
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often in combination with one another, gave elites powerful reasons to enact 
reforms. Without strong incentives to defend the Party, and thanks to a long 
history  of  gradual  reforms,  the  HSWP collapsed  in  the  fall  of  1989.  On 
September  7th,  the  Party  ceased  to  exist,  and  transformed  itself  into  the 
Hungarian  Socialist  Party  (HSP).  However,  at  its  congress  a  month  later  it 
became obvious that little enthusiasm existed for the successor organization. For 
example, most party members serving in congress failed to join the HSP. 
As I have shown, the mid-1980s represent a particularly important time in 
the  political  development  of  Hungary.  It  was  during  this  period  that  Party 
reformers  began to  emerge  as  a  powerful  alternative  to  the  old  guard,  and, 
perhaps even more importantly, began to form links with reformers outside the 
system. As one expert explains:
The  transformation  in  the  mid-1980s  of  informal  circles  of  politicized 
intellectuals  into  organized  groups  and,  in  some  cases,  into  political 
minimovements was a complex process. Up to that point the “informal sphere” 
of the second society and official toleration of individual strategies of “interest 
realization”  had  helped  ameliorate  social  pressures  for  organized  interest 
articulation.  Moreover,  the  Pozsgay-led  PPF had recruited  and promoted,  as 
regime-sponsored  social  organizations,  intelligentsia  groups  that  agreed  to 
abstain  from  explicitly  political  activities.  Prior  to  1988  the  regime  and 
Pozsgay’s networks had succeeded in preventing all  but a few social  groups 
from joining the democratic opposition. (Tőkés 1996: 309)
While elites played the arguably most important role in Hungary’s transition, 
any  understanding  of  the  process  is  incomplete  without  attention  to 
developments in Hungary’s civil society.
Civil Society
“Although Hungarian society was eventually  mobilized in the late  and mid-
1980s, it never reached the level of mobilization taking place in Poland during 
the  Solidarność uprising,  or  that  of  Czechoslovakia  and  the  GDR in  1989” 
(Saxonberg 2001: 211-2). This is puzzling, as we might predict that Hungary’s 
less repressive environment would stimulate organized dissent. Yet this did not 
happen on a large scale. As mentioned earlier, it could simply be the case that 
Hungary’s leaders had found the perfect balance between authoritarianism and 
liberalism,  thus  keeping  the  population  adequately  content  and  reducing 
incentives for civil society mobilization. Another possibility, more historically 
grounded and perhaps more interesting, is that civil society mobilization against 
the state did not occur on a wide scale because Hungarians had once before 
ventured  down  that  road  with  less  than  satisfactory  consequences.  In  fact, 
Hungary’s 1956 revolution may be more similar to what happened in the GDR 
and  Czechoslovakia  in  1989  in  many  ways  than  the  country’s  negotiated 
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transition in that year of change. In 1956, once the brief armed uprising had 
been defeated by the invading Soviet troops, civil society organizations assumed 
leadership of the revolution. The Central Workers Council of Greater Budapest, 
the Revolutionary Council  of  Hungarian Intellectuals,  and the Revolutionary 
Council of Young Workers all opted for nonviolent tactics in a final attempt to 
bring  the  faltering  revolution  to  a  successful  conclusion.  As  Ekiert  (1996) 
explains:  
Unable to resist  with arms, workers brought the country to a virtual halt  by 
widespread industrial action. The general strike that followed the invasion was 
one of the most full-scale and united worker actions in the modern history of the 
European working-class movement. The strike was purely political in character, 
lasted over a month, and represented the most serious challenge to the Soviet 
invaders and the new rulers of Hungary. (71-2)
In short, 1956 represents civil society’s final stand against the communist state. 
The memory of 1956 had a tremendous impact on events in the late 1980s: not 
only did the state fear  a repeat  of that  year’s events,  but it  appears that the 
opposition too was apprehensive of taking the country down that road. Hence, 
both sides had a shared interest in settling for a negotiated transition. 
Still, a Hungarian civil society, albeit self-restrained in comparison to that 
of other Eastern European countries, did exist. The early signs of a Hungarian 
opposition  can  be  traced  back  to  the  late  1960s  and  the  emergence  of  the 
“Budapest School”, which consisted of “humanistic Marxist philosophers”. By 
the early 1970s, hardliners within the party perceived the Budapest School to be 
threatening enough to demand sanctions  and disciplinary  actions  against  the 
intellectuals. Consequently, eight of the group’s most prominent students lost 
their positions within the university, and four of them decided to emigrate. One 
of the group’s leaders, Miklós Haraszti, was sentenced to eight months in prison 
for “having given a few friends copies of his powerful personal account of the 
debilitating piece-work system he found in a factory where he had worked for 
six  months”  (Stokes  1993:  87-8).  Purges  of  these  kinds  were  unusual  in 
Hungary,  as  Haraszti’s  case  in  1973 represents  the  country’s  last  significant 
political trial (Stokes 1993: 88). This stands in sharp contrast to Czechoslovakia 
and the GDR where dissidents were routinely sent to prison or condemned to 
lives as doorkeepers and window washers.
As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Helsinki accords mark the birth of 
“an identifiable opposition movement, as opposed to dissident individuals” in 
Hungary  (Stokes  1993:  88;  Falk 2003:  128).  The country’s  first  typewritten 
samizdat publication appeared in 1976, and in September 1978 the Hungarian 
version of the “Flying University” offered its first lecture. Also, the advent of 
Solidarity  in  Poland had an important  impact  on would-be oppositionists  in 
Hungary (Falk 2003: 128). In late 1980/early 1981, twenty-five of them met in 
18
Budapest with the intention of establishing a journal. 
Despite the many negative opinions expressed, the most poignant of which was  
that they had no vital issue capable of mobilizing popular support [emphasis 
added], the meeting led to a year-long series of discussions among a group of 
about seven persons that in December 1981 produced Hungary’s first and most 
important opposition journal, Beszélö (Speaker). Just as KOR did in Poland, the 
editors printed their names and addresses. “We have nothing to hide,” was their 
motto. (Stokes 1993: 89)   
Despite their best efforts, the intellectual opposition failed to garner widespread 
popular support. In part, this was the dissidents’ own fault, as “there were no 
systematic  efforts  on  the  part  of  Hungarian  intellectuals  to  ‘reach  out’ to 
independent  worker  organizations,  as  no  such  organizations  existed”  (Falk 
2003: 129). Thus, while relatively free to express their opinions, the Hungarian 
activists failed to have any large impact on society, perhaps due to the lack of a 
“vital issue capable of mobilizing popular support.” As in the rest of Eastern 
Europe then, the opportunities afforded by Helsinki did not have societal impact 
until Gorbachev took power. As we shall see, it was at that point that explicitly 
political groups began to emerge in Hungary.
The Democratization Movement
Opposition to the party and the state remained limited until 1987. Until then, 
street protests, on the rare occasions they occurred, were punished with “arrests, 
detentions, and beatings” (Kontler 2002: 462). However, unlike elsewhere in the 
region, the government remained for the most part content to respond to less 
high-profile  opposition  activities  “with  occasional  harassment:  sporadic 
searches, the confiscation of illegal publications, the rejection of travel permits, 
silences  imposed  on  writers  and  the  replacement  of  editorial  boards  in  the 
‘primary’ sphere when they were deemed to have gone too far in cultivating 
forbidden  fruit”  (Kontler  2002:  462).  Until  1987,  opposition  groups  were 
composed of “a few dozen individuals, maintaining contacts with a few hundred 
others  among  the  intellectuals  of  research  institutes,  university  departments, 
editorial offices and student circles” (Kontler 2002: 461). These small groups, 
who  had  up  until  the  mid-1980s  been  content  to  implore  the  party-state  to 
respect  human  rights,  now  began  to  voice  more  overtly  political  demands 
(Bruszt & Stark 1991: 211). Interestingly enough, this politicization process was 
not  due  to  mass  pressure  from  below,  but  “largely  the  product  of  elite 
initiatives” (Batt 1991: 55), placing it  in stark contrast  to the biographies of 
Solidarity and Civic Forum (Welsh 1994: 389).  
The  composition  of  Hungary’s  opposition  reflected  the  country’s  pre-
communist political divisions between urbanists and populists. The urbanists, 
often  referred  to  as  the  “democratic  opposition”  made  up  the  faction  most 
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similar to opposition groups in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, emphasizing 
as they did human rights  and democratic principles in the civic sphere.  The 
populists, on the other hand, were more restrained in their outlook and preferred 
to  focus  on  less  politically  charged  issues,  such  as  the  situation  of  ethnic 
Hungarians in neighboring countries, crime, religious issues, and demographic 
problems,  but  also  “the  effects  of  communism on national  consciousness  in 
general”  (Kontler  2002:  462).  Naturally,  when the time was ripe  for  reform 
communists to choose an opposition faction with which to enter into dialogue, 
the populists emerged as the most viable option. Hence, in September 1987, the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum - MDF or HDF) was 
created  in  Lakitelek  with  “official  acquiescence”  (Falk  2003:  139).  In  fact, 
Pozsgay and a few of his reformist Party colleagues were even present at the 
group’s founding meeting. Beginning as “an intellectual and political movement 
inspired by the populist message” the MDF gradually transformed itself into a 
political party and emerged as the winners of the first free elections in 1990 
(Falk 2003: 139; Kontler 2002: 464). Still, it would be difficult to equate the 
Hungarian Forum with those of Czechoslovakia or the GDR, since there was 
such a close and symbiotic relationship between the organization and the state. 
As Tőkés (1996) explains,
The establishment of the HDF was in part the result of the HSWP successor 
generation’s  strategy  to  fill  with  nationalist,  but  proreforrn,  provincial 
intellectuals the growing space between the rearguard party and the regime’s 
established policy lobbies. The trade-off for the Populist intellectuals’ support of 
the Grósz-led party insurgents was the regime’s toleration of the HDF’s low-key 
nationalism and its  advocacy of the cause of Hungarian ethnic minorities in 
Romania and Slovakia. HDF-sponsored public meetings in early 1988, though 
quite  self-restrained  affairs  also  helped  articulate  the  critical  socialist 
intellectuals’ message. For services rendered in assisting with Kádár’s ouster, 
the  HDF was  rewarded  by Grósz  with  the  opportunity  to  be  the  first  civic 
organization to organize a mass demonstration in [sic] behalf of human rights in 
Transylvania, in June 1988. … In any case, as a political movement the HDF 
was  more  of  a  human  rights  lobby  for  ethnic  Hungarians  abroad  than  a 
champion of political democracy, social justice, and national self-determination 
for those at home. (Tőkés 1996: 309-10)  
On May 1, 1988, nearly a year after the creation of the MDF, the democratic 
opposition  reached  a  similar  milestone.  On that  date,  “the  Network of  Free 
Initiatives” emerged as the MDF’s urbanist counterpart, and on November 13 th 
of the same year it transformed itself into the  Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége 
(SZDSZ),  or  the  Alliance  for  Free  Democrats,  becoming  a  political  party 
following the passing of new legislation in early 1989. The organization was 
Western-oriented,  liberal,  and  advocated  “a  European-style  democracy  and 
Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact” (Stokes 1993: 97). 
The last of the most important opposition groups in the democratization 
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process was the Young Democrats, more commonly known by its Hungarian 
acronym FIDESZ. Emerging on the political  stage only in late March 1988, 
FIDESZ  nonetheless  had  a  long  history  and  was  an  outgrowth  of  the 
“simmering generational rebellion of university and college students that had 
begun in the late 1970s” (Tőkés 1996: 312). Officially, Hungary had only one 
youth  organization,  the  Young  Communist  League  (YCL),  but  as  this 
organization was both ineffectual and uninterested in advocating the interests of 
young Hungarians, it did not appeal to either its supposed constituents or the 
state.  The  organization’s  gradual  collapse  in  the  1980s  created  a  political 
vacuum on  university  campuses  that  young  radicals,  who  would  eventually 
come to constitute the core of FIDESZ, were more than happy to occupy. In the 
1990 elections, and in the 1989 referendum, the Free Democrats and FIDESZ 
came together in a powerful alliance.
MDF,  the  Free  Democrats,  and  FIDESZ  became  the  main  political 
opposition groups in the transition process. However, “at the end of 1988 in 
Hungary there were twenty-one new or recently founded political associations 
that identified themselves as ‘society,’ ‘league,’ ‘association,’ or ‘front’ and the 
Independent  Smallholders’  Party  (ISP)”  (Tőkés  1996:  308),  a  resurrected 
political party that had won 57 percent of the votes in parliamentary elections in 
1945  (Hankiss  1990:  17).  While  many  of  these  parties  played  individually 
important  roles  in  the  transition,  their  collective  effort,  in  the  shape  of  the 
Opposition Round Table (ORT, or  Ellenzéki Kerekasztal, EKA, in Hungarian) 
was to have a much greater impact on Hungary’s journey toward democracy.
At the end of 1988, despite the large number of opposition groups, the 
situation  looked  bleak.  Bruszt  and  Stark  (1991)  sum  the  situation  up  by 
suggesting that at that point in time,
the  independent  organizations  of  Hungarian  civil  society were  neither  large, 
cohesive  nor  fundamentally  committed  to  challenging  the  legitimacy of  the 
communist regime. In fact, that the category of “opposition” could be used as a 
collective  noun  to  refer  to  such  a  set  of  weak,  diverse  and  fragmented 
organizations would scarcely have occurred to anyone active on the Hungarian 
political scene. (218)
But things were about to change. The party-state sought to further weaken the 
opposition  groups  through  a  strategy  of  divide  and  conquer,  engaging  in 
separate  dialogues  with  various  groups.  In  response  to  this,  the  EKA was 
established  in  March  1989.  In  one  fell  move,  the  opposition  thus  greatly 
improved its strength by uniting behind a common front. Although still inferior 
to the Party in virtually every way conceivable, the new sense of unity had the 
desired impact. The EKA rejected the Party’s strategy of individual discussions, 
and instead
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called for bilateral negotiations between the power structure and representatives 
of the opposition, rejected all legislative proposals that would remove from the 
hands of a future, freely elected parliament the opportunity to formulate a state 
and a social system, and declared a willingness to enter into negotiations only in 
regard to laws directly related to the holding of free elections. (Bruszt 1989: 
375)
The creation of the EKA was in part the brainchild of the  Független Jogasz 
Forum (FJF, Independent Lawyers’ Forum), a group created in November 1988 
with  the  objective  of  pushing  for  “legislative  changes  in  the  democratic 
tradition” (Sajó 1996: 71). The leadership of the Party was naturally less than 
content with this development and sought to influence the composition of the 
EKA, but in the end, with the EKA insisting it would negotiate only with the 
HSWP (as opposed to the state per se), Miklós Németh, the prime minister at 
the time, had to agree to the EKA’s demands. As we shall see in the “protest” 
section of this report, the EKA came to have a large influence on the transition 
process, but it is important to understand that this “ad-hoc alliance of Hungary’s 
new political elites” was exactly that. Overwhelmingly, the EKA consisted of 
intellectuals  unknown to the  general  public  (Tőkés  1996:  314).  Despite  this 
arguably serious shortcoming,  the EKA sat  down with the Party-state  at  the 
National Round Table (NRT) in June 1989 as an equal negotiating party. The 
fact that it could do so with limited public support suggests that the transition 
process was initiated from above by elites both keen on reform and afraid of the 
prospect of another revolution. 
New Social Movements
Despite the political opposition’s best efforts, Hungarians remained uninterested 
in  their  efforts  until  1989.  Instead,  and similarly  to  other  Eastern  European 
countries,  “new  social  movement”  mobilization  became  the  most  visible 
expression  of  discontent  in  Hungary.  As  Sajó  (1996)  puts  it,  “there  was, 
however, no mass support for the opposition except in one respect. Ecologists 
managed to mobilize an increasing number of people against the Danube dam 
project, which was considered disastrous in ecological as well as in business 
terms”  (70).  “The  Danube dam project”  was  a  gigantic  effort  intending the 
construction of “a huge system of dams, resevoirs [sic], and canals over a 138-
mile  stretch  of  the  Danube  River”  (Stokes  1993:  94).  Officially  called  the 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, it was conceived as a collaborative effort with 
Czechoslovakia,  and had first  been proposed in the 1950s as part of plan to 
provide  the  country  with  hydroelectric  power  through  the  construction  of  a 
massive dam on the Danube. In 1977, Austria was brought in as a third partner 
and loan guarantor for the project. In 1983, János Vargha, a biologist-activist, 
created  the  Danube  Circle  (Duna  Kör)  with  the  objective  of  disseminating 
information about the ecological threats posed by the project (Falk 2003:142-3). 
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Would-be  political  activists  eventually  “joined the dam issue  not  only 
because  it  was  one  they  could  believe  in  but  because  they  found  that  a 
significant number of people otherwise unwilling to enter into political debates, 
to say nothing of becoming oppositionists, were willing to come forward on this 
issue” (Stokes 1993: 94-5). Other small groups joined the Danube circle in its 
activities  against  the  project.  After  some  back  and  forth  discussions  in 
parliament, the decision was finally taken in the fall 1988 for the dam to be built 
at Bős-Nagymaros. But the environmental movement fought back: in September 
1988, 30,000 people demonstrated against the construction of the dam in from 
of parliament  in “the first  major public questioning of  the legitimacy of  the 
Parliament” (Bruszt & Stark 1991: 220), and in October a petition was signed 
by over 70,000 citizens. Finally, in 1989, the Danube Circle collected more than 
100,000 signatures demanding a referendum on the issue and in May of that 
year the government declared the project suspended (Falk 2003: 143; Kis 1995: 
43;  Stokes  1993:  95).  Stokes  (1993)  suggests  that  “the  contrast  with 
Czechoslovakia,  which tolerated little  or  no opposition to  the dam, suggests 
how far Hungary had come by the end of 1988” (95).
As in other  Eastern European countries,  a  peace movement  existed in 
Hungary, which Falk (2003) refers to as “an important political force, especially 
in mobilizing young people,” that “grew rapidly in the early 1980s, and sought 
to  maintain  a  distinct  position,  separate  and  independent  from  both  the 
democratic opposition and the party-state sponsored peace organizations” (143). 
Still, it is unclear how organized this movement was. Like their Soviet satellite 
colleagues,  Hungarian  peace  activists  were  mainly  concerned  with  the 
proliferation of nuclear arms, but also sought to combine peace concerns with a 
call for the respect of human rights. Secondary school students formed the Anti-
Nuclear Campaign Hungary (ANC), and in 1982 Ferenc Kőszegi, a seasoned 
peace  activist,  founded the Peace  Group for  Dialogue.  Some of  the group’s 
activities included “semi-official public meetings” and “an unsuccessful attempt 
to  set  up a  peace  camp modeled  on Greenham Common” (Falk  2003:  143; 
Lomax 1982)
Women’s mobilizations with an explicit emphasis on women’s situation 
in Hungary appears to have been absent from the political stage. Swain (1992) 
states that FIDESZ’s “Alice Madzsár Women’s Group was the nearest thing to a 
women’s  movement  on  the  political  scene,  and  had  organized  the  women’s 
demonstration against the Bős-Nagymaros dam in September 1988” (22).
Ethnic/Nationalist Movements
Another source of mobilization was the ethnic (or nationalist, but the literature 
refers to mobilization on behalf of ethnic minorities) movement that took root in 
Hungary during the 1980s. As in the case of both the environmentalist and the 
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peace activists, the ethnic movement was able to carve out a space for itself 
because it was concerned with a largely non-political issue. Furthermore, the 
ethnic movement’s focus was literally outside Hungary, and more specifically in 
Romania. The MDF was one of the organizations that mobilized in support of 
ethnic Hungarian villages in Romania purportedly at risk of eradication when 
Ceauşescu sought to make room for “‘modern’ apartment complexes” (Stokes 
1993:  95;  Tőkés  1996:  309-10).  By  June  1988,  the  perceived  situation  of 
Hungarians in Romania had become so bad that, under the umbrella of MDF, 
“some  thirty  thousand  people  demonstrated  in  Budapest  against  the  village 
reconstruction plan and the Hungarian government’s lack of action, the largest 
demonstration in Hungary since 1956” (Stokes 1993: 95). Despite the domestic 
political connotations of this event, Tőkés (1996) maintains that “as a political 
movement the [MDF] was more of a human rights lobby for ethnic Hungarians 
abroad than a champion of political democracy, social justice, and national self-
determination for those at home” (310). 
The Religious Movement
The role of the Hungarian churches in the transition is disputed. Hankiss (1990) 
categorically claims that 
The  Hungarian  Churches  didn’t  play  any  kind  of  role  in  the  Hungarian 
revolution; nothing like in Poland or in East Germany. The Hungarian Churches 
were compromised and became very conformist throughout the forty years of 
Communism. We didn’t have a Polish Catholic Church; we didn’t have an East 
German Lutheran  Church.  We simply had Churches  and Church hierarchies 
which  were  deeply  conformist  –  they  even  helped  the  State  to  oppress 
independent Churches. (18)
Others have been more nuanced in their evaluations. For example, Falk (2003) 
explains that “anti-militarism and pacifism were reflected by minority voices in 
the Catholic Church in Hungary,” although “efforts by those such as Catholic 
priests László Kovács and András Gromon, both of whom delivered pacifist 
sermons  and  supported  conscientious  objection  to  the  required  18  months 
military service, were met with official church reprisals” (143). Lomax (1982: 
30) adds that, in the early 1980s, more than a hundred “local communities” of 
Catholics followed the teachings of György Bulányi, who preached a Franciscan 
message  of  poverty,  humility  and  nonviolence.  Despite  these  contributions, 
there  is  little  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  Church  or  a  religious  movement 
played an important role in Hungary.  Perhaps Falk’s balanced evaluation says it 
best: “As in Slovakia, the official church supported the regime, but the Catholic 
faithful found inspiration within their beliefs to oppose it” (143).
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The Labor Movement
Organized labor did not play an important role in the revolution. While workers 
attended some of the large public gatherings in 1989, they never organized on 
the basis of class.  Scholars have explained this by pointing to the country’s 
history.  Immediately  after  the  communist  takeover  in  1948,  the  independent 
trade  unions  were  incorporated  into  the  state  structure  as  part  of  the 
demobilization  of  civil  society.  Still,  the  Democratic  League  of  Free  Trade 
Unions was established in 1989 to serve as an umbrella organization for the 
independent unions that were now forming and receiving state approval. While 
the new organization organized leaflet campaigns to encourage workers to leave 
the official National Council of Trade Unions, its role can hardly be compared 
to that of Solidarity in Poland, or even the factory strikes in Czechoslovakia 
(Falk  2003:  145;  Hankiss  1990:  20).  As  Hankiss  (1990)  sums  up,  unions, 
“which in 1948 had been one of the first, [were] in 1990 the last bastion of 
Communism in Hungary” (25). Consequently, it would have been surprising to 
see organized labor lead the march toward Hungarian democracy.
The Student Movement
The  Hungarian  student  movement  is  perhaps  best  described  as  “limited.” 
Although students sought to democratize the Young Communist League (KISZ) 
in the 1980s, this effort was eventually abandoned. Instead, “an overtly political 
discussion  club,”  Polvax,  was  formed  in  the  Karl  Marx  University  of 
Economics.  Polvax  attracted  hundreds  of  students  who  attended  debates  on 
political  issues (international  and domestic),  economic reform, human rights, 
and  communism  in  Europe.  Finally,  as  noted  above,  on  March  30,  1988, 
FIDESZ was founded by a few dozen students, mainly from the István Bibó 
College of Law. The activists were mainly stirred by issues of political reform, 
the Nagymaros Dam project, and young people’s issues such as conscientious 
objection to military service (Falk 2003: 144-5). Like most other branches of 
civil society, students mobilized late, although they did play an important role in 
the mass actions of  1989. Also,  FIDESZ participated in the National  Round 
Table that began in June 1989.
Protest
Hungary’s transition to democracy lacks many of the dramatic scenes witnessed 
in other Eastern European countries in 1989. As Bruszt (1989) observed,  
Unless one regards the “sausage strike” organized by the official trade union to 
protest meat-price increases as one, there were no significant strike movements. 
Aside from two important mass actions in March and in June, there were no 
nationwide antigovernment demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands or 
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millions of people as in the GDR and in Czechoslovakia. No violent action took 
place, and no overt threat of the use of force was made, except for one made by 
a  small-businessman  member  of  the  Hungarian  Socialist  Workers  party 
[MSZMP]. Everyone believed he was a mental retard. Well then, what did take 
place in Hungary? Negotiations!” (366-7)
Others have echoed his point. For example, Kis (1995) explains that “apart from 
the two months of campaigning for the referendum [after the conclusion of the 
NRT], no large masses took active part in shaping the regime change. There was 
a  public  opinion,  the  fluctuations  of  which  had  a  strong  influence  on  the 
relations of force between political groups. But however politically alert, this 
opinion  allowed the  elites  to  decide  the  transition  among themselves”  (53). 
Nonetheless, while not necessarily instrumental to the outcome of Hungary’s 
negotiated transition, several episodes of protest did occur in the year and a half 
leading  up  to  the  initiation  of  the  NRT.  Some  of  these,  such  as  the 
environmental movement’s mobilization against the building of the Nagymaros 
dam and the demonstrations in support of Hungarian minorities in Romania, 
have been discussed above, and will thus not be dealt with again. 
One of the first semi-political gatherings took place on January 30, 1988, 
when the newly formed MDF held the first of a series of public meetings in 
Budapest’s Jurta Theatre. Estimates suggest that 500 people attended, with the 
HSWP instructing its members to stay away on pain of dismissal from the party. 
March and May witnessed similar meetings take place (Swain 1992: 18; 2006: 
146).  Also  in  March,  10,000  people  participated  in  an  unofficial 
commemoration of the 1848 revolution, apparently without significant political 
overtones (Humphrey 1990), and in June the police “dispersed a small crowd of 
several  hundred  people”  seeking  to  mark  the  thirtieth  anniversary  of  Imre 
Nagy’s execution (Bruszt & Stark 1991: 219; Falk 2003: 152-3).
Momentum gathered  for  the  democratization  forces  in  the  winter  and 
spring of 1989. In January, a new law was passed that officially permitted the 
establishment  of  associations,  including  political  parties  and  labor  unions, 
which naturally encouraged nascent democratic forces. Furthermore, that same 
month, Pozsgay revealed the findings of his commissioned report on the radio, 
namely that the 1956 event was not a counter-revolution, but rather a popular 
uprising.  This admission made way for  the final  nail  in the regime’s coffin, 
namely  the  rehabilitation  and  reburial  of  Imre  Nagy  on  June  16,  1989.  On 
March 15th, on the anniversary of the 1848 revolution, twenty-four independent 
organizations rejected  an invitation from the party-state  to  participate  in  the 
official  celebrations.  Instead,  they organized their  own demonstration,  which 
drew  a  crowd  of  over  100,000  people,  thus  overshadowing  the  “official” 
ceremonies. “This demonstration was the public signal that civil society could 
also play the politics of confrontation” (Bruszt & Stark 1991: 222). In addition 
to  sending a powerful  message to the regime,  the March 15th demonstration 
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infused the opposition organization with confidence and was instrumental in the 
creation of the Opposition Round Table (EKA) on March 23rd just a week later. 
In  a  similar  fashion,  the League of  Independent  Trade Unions  organized an 
alternative demonstration to the official state celebrations on May 1st. This time, 
the unofficial event drew between 60,000 and 100,000 protesters, making it six 
to ten times larger than the state’s official demonstration. Crucially, both rallies 
were  broadcast  on  state  TV,  allowing  the  Hungarian  people  to  witness  the 
shifting of power in real time. The opposition also used this event as the first 
public appearance of the EKA as a united group (Bruszt & Stark 1991: 222; 
226).
Notwithstanding these early events, the most important gathering of the 
transition process occurred on June 16th when 200,000-250,000 came together 
for Imre Nagy’s funeral in what Falk (2003) describes as the “closest thing to [a 
euphoric  moment  of  popular  mobilization  in  support  of  a  set  of  political 
demand] in terms of emotive symbolism, myth making, and mass participation” 
(152). As early as spring 1988, as the first signs of meaningful political reform 
were emerging with the removal of Kádár, relatives and survivors of the 1956 
revolution created the Committee for  Historical  Justice  and,  in collaboration 
with some of the main opposition groups as well as consultations with Pozsgay 
and other leading reformists, were able to push for a ceremonial burial meant to 
represent  a “political  resurrection” (Garton Ash 1990: 49;  Falk 2003: 152-3; 
Tőkés, 1996: 290). The re-burial of Nagy had been planned for quite some time, 
but its timing turned out to be most fortunate for the opposition. Sajó (1996) 
explains: 
By the end of May, after a long three-week stalemate, it became obvious that 
there would be a mass demonstration at the reburial of Imre Nagy and the other 
1956  martyrs,  who  were  buried  in  unidentified  mass  graves  after  their 
execution. Moreover, the international media were extremely keen to cover the 
ceremony. It was also understood by EKA that there was growing tension within 
the  HSWP  arising  from  the  fear  that  they  could  not  control  the  public 
demonstration. On May 31, EKA realized that the June 16 reburial could be a 
vital  opportunity  for  them.  Prior  to  the  reburial,  EKA power  would  surely 
increase,  but once the day had passed peacefully,  the HSWP would become 
rigid again. (77-8)         
Fearful that June 16th would cause a violent repeat of the 1956 revolution, the 
Party  announced  on  June  10th that  it  would  sit  down  with  the  EKA for  a 
National Round Table to discuss the transition to a pluralist democratic system. 
Just three days later, and, rather tellingly, three days prior to the funeral, the 
NRT commenced (Swain 2006: 149). In his typically poetic manner, Timothy 
Garton Ash (1990) has described the “Hungarian funeral” as “a landmark in the 
post-war history of Eastern Europe” that “clearly marked the end of the post-
1956 period” (53).    
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From a social movement perspective, perhaps the most interesting aspect 
of  the  NRT has  little  to  do  with  composition  or  outcome,  but  rather  with 
motivation.  Because  very  few links  existed  between  the  opposition  and  the 
population at large, we are confronted with an absurd situation where it seems 
the party leaders and the opposition had a shared interest in keeping the people 
out of the equation. In contrast to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR, where 
the  opposition  was backed  by  the  people,  no  such  link  existed  in  Hungary. 
Rather, both the party and the opposition feared that a popular uprising might 
well  be  uncontrollable.  Consequently,  despite  the  absence  of  a  threat  of 
violence,  both parties  acted as if  such a threat  existed.  In the words of  one 
commentator, “the tacit agreement between the outgoing and incoming political 
elites  to  exclude  the  ‘streets’ from  their  negotiations  made  political  sense. 
Above all, it permitted both sides to speak for their respective – the no longer 
and the not yet existing – constituencies without being second-guessed by the 
subjects of the exercise” (Tőkés 1996: 306).
Despite the absence of mobilization from below, the mere threat of street 
politics and the memory of 1956 went a long way in ensuring a truly inclusive 
NRT consisting of the EKA, the regime, and the so-called third side which was 
made up of trade unions and other civil society organizations. The EKA, for its 
part,  was  composed  of  50  main  delegates  and  over  500  experts  from nine 
opposition organizations (Bruszt 1989: 367). Unlike the Polish Round Table, the 
Hungarian version made it clear that compromise with the regime – in the sense 
of trading free elections for guaranteed communist representation in the new 
system – was not an option. Still, the final agreement signed on September 18th 
contained one concession to the former rulers: the president would be elected 
directly by the population, rather than by the parliament, as the opposition had 
proposed.  A  general  election  for  the  presidency  would  undoubtedly  have 
favored Pozsgay, the HSP candidate, since all opposition politicians were more 
or  less  completely  unknown to the general  public  whereas  Pozsgay enjoyed 
near-total recognition. It was this provision that caused the SZDSZ and FIDESZ 
to demand a referendum late in the fall of 1989. Their efforts were successful, 
and when the Hungarian people had voiced its  opinion, the SZDSZ/FIDESZ 
side scored a slim but important victory. While the HSWP, now re-created as the 
HSP, was already facing the prospect of an uphill struggle in the parliamentary 
elections, the outcome of the referendum sealed their fate – in the short run. In 
1994 they would return to power, but ironically that only served to prove that 
Hungarian democracy had consolidated (Hankiss 1990; Swain 2006).  
Conclusion
Can the Hungarian transition be construed as democratization from below? The 
evidence  provided  here  would  suggest  “perhaps”,  but  only  with  important 
qualifiers attached. While the rather amicable negotiations between the state and 
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the opposition effectively excluded the latter’s need for  popular  support,  the 
potential for mass mobilization remained on the minds of both sides. In other 
words, the fear of popular mobilization affected the transition process, while 
actual mobilization can only be said to have had a very minor impact. The large 
demonstrations on March 15th, May 1st, and June 16th did matter, as they showed 
both the Party and the opposition what might happen should discussions not 
provide a satisfactory solution. Still, we will never know if Hungarians would 
have  taken  to  the  streets  in  the  manner  of  their  Czechoslovakian  and  East 
German brothers and sisters. 
So  why  did  the  transition  occur  so  smoothly?  One  answer,  albeit  an 
unexciting  one,  is  that  nobody  who  mattered  was  against  democratization. 
Reformers within the Party had had their minds set on pluralism for years, long 
before  Gorbachev’s  emergence,  and  this  made  for  a  drastically  different 
trajectory to other Eastern European countries. Throughout my research I have 
had the feeling that in contrast to communist leaders in Czechoslovakia and the 
GDR, Hungarian leaders were not upset, shocked, or troubled by Gorbachev’s 
policy change.  Instead,  they welcomed it  as  a long-awaited friend.  In  short, 
glasnost and perestroika were not threats to the Hungarian communists – they 
were  opportunities. Seen from this perspective it becomes rather plain to see 
that mass mobilization in Hungary simply was not necessary. Democracy was 
already on its way. 
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